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Hutcheson	and	Reid	on	Natural	Beauty	Emily	Brady,	University	of	Edinburgh			
Introduction		In	this	paper,	I	compare	ideas	about	natural	beauty	in	the	philosophies	of	Hutcheson	and	Reid,	with	special	attention	to	the	relevance	of	their	ideas	to	contemporary	debates	in	aesthetics	of	nature	and	environmental	aesthetics.	Why	look	to	this	period	for	ideas	about	aesthetics	of	nature?	The	principles	of	taste,	beauty,	sublimity,	novelty,	ugliness	structured	theories	of	aesthetics	during	this	time.	By	structuring	theories	through	‘taste’	and	focusing	on	capacities	in	the	subject	such	as	perception	and	imagination,	the	starting	point	was	not	questions	about	the	arts	and	their	status	in	society	(as	we	see,	chiefly,	in	contemporary	aesthetics).	Rather,	the	starting	point	and	subject	matter	of	aesthetics	was	conceived	broadly	in	relation	to	these	principles.	That	subject	matter	included	animals,	the	human	figure,	landscapes,	natural	processes	and	places,	as	well	as	gardens	and	other	modified	environments.	This	wide	remit	can	also	be	explained	by	the	influence	of	the	natural	sciences	and	religion	on	aesthetic	theories	of	the	time.	Ideas	that	were	central	to	eighteenth-century	aesthetics	resonate	with	new	thinking	in	environmental	
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aesthetics,	for	example,	non-instrumental	aesthetic	valuing	of	nature	as	emerging	from	disinterestedness,	the	association	of	aesthetic	value	with	moral	value,	and	the	role	of	knowledge	in	appreciation.			 This	is	a	worthwhile	project	for	a	few	reasons.	Along	with	Addison,	Hutcheson	had	a	strong	influence	on	aesthetic	theories	developed	in	the	eighteenth	century,	and	both	Hutcheson	and	Shaftesbury	were	important	influences	on	Reid.	Reid’s	explicit	criticisms	of	Hutcheson	are,	themselves,	interesting	for	reflecting	on	aesthetic	appreciation	of	nature.	In	contemporary	debates	about	aesthetics	of	nature,	while	Kant	has	been	discussed	widely,	Hutcheson	and	Reid	have	not,	and	together	they	have	interesting	ideas	to	contribute	to	these	discussions.1		In	historical	discussions	about	eighteenth-century	aesthetic	theory,	natural	beauty	tends	to	get	short	shrift.2	Also,	Reid’s	work	has	enjoyed	a	rise	in	importance,	generally,	in	contemporary	philosophy,	yet	his	aesthetic	theory	remains	understudied.3		
																																																								1	Hutcheson	and	Reid	are	not	the	only	philosophers	who	offer	interesting	ideas	about	natural	beauty	in	the	eighteenth	century,	but	I	take	the	position	that	their	ideas	are	interesting	and	relevant	for	the	reasons	I	set	out	in	this	paper.	Perhaps	the	widest	discussion	of	aesthetics	of	nature	among	philosophers	of	this	period	can	be	found	in	numerous	treatises	on	the	sublime;	see	Emily	Brady,	The	
Sublime	in	Modern	Philosophy:	Aesthetics,	Ethics,	and	Nature	(Cambridge,	2013),	11-46.	
2	For	example,	Peter	Kivy’s	important	study	of	Hutcheson	discusses	his	views	of	natural	beauty,	but	not	in	very	much	depth;	see,	The	Seventh	Sense:	Francis	Hutcheson	and	Eighteenth-Century	Aesthetics,	2nd	ed.	(Oxford,	2003).	
3	Esther	Engels	Kroeker,	‘Thomas	Reid	Today’,	Journal	of	Scottish	Philosophy,	13	(2015),	95-114,	104.	For	some	of	the	latest	work	in	this	area,	see	Rebecca	Copenhaver,	‘Thomas	Reid	and	Aesthetic	
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	 The	paper	begins	with	a	short	background	section	on	empirically-driven	theories	of	aesthetics,	before	proceeding	to	a	discussion	of	Hutcheson’s	ideas	on	the	sense	of	beauty,	perception	and	natural	beauty.	I	turn	to	Reid	on	these	same	topics	next,	showing	how	his	theory	differs	from	Hutcheson’s,	and	what	it	has	to	offer	in	that	regard.	In	the	final	section,	I	argue	that	their	ideas	on	natural	beauty	usefully	inform	two	central	issues	in	contemporary	debates:	what	it	means	to	appreciate	nature	‘on	its	own	terms’,	and	the	role	of	perception	and	knowledge	in	that	appreciation.	In	discussing	each	philosopher,	my	focus	will	be	on	their	concept	of	beauty,	and	I	shall	set	the	aside	question	of	whether	or	not	there	is	a	standard	of	taste	with	respect	to	beauty.		
Empiricism	and	Nature		Many	of	the	philosophers	writing	about	beauty	and	other	aesthetic	categories	were	also	interested	in	human	nature	and	Newtonian	science.	This	is	significant	for	writing	in	aesthetics	because	it	will	have	developed,	in	Britain	at	least,	within	a	context	of	empirical	philosophy	deeply	influenced	by	Locke’s	empiricism,	which	brought	the	senses	into	prominence.	The	aesthetic	sense	was	described	as	an	
																																																																																																																																																																					Perception’,	and	Rachel	Zuckert,	‘Thomas	Reid’s	Expressivist	Aesthetics’,	both	in	Rebecca	Copenhaver	and	Todd	Buras,	ed.,	Thomas	Reid	on	Mind,	Knowledge,	and	Value	(Oxford,	expected	2015).	Hutcheson’s	aesthetic	theory,	while	receiving	more	attention	than	Reid	in	aesthetics	and	moral	philosophy,	is	also	relatively	understudied.	As	an	addition	to	Kivy’s	in	depth	work,	the	current	volume	of	papers	will	help	to	remedy	this.	
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‘internal	sense’	and	compared	to	other	senses	such	as	gustatory	taste.4	In	particular,	Hutcheson	became	an	important	influence	on	subsequent	aesthetic	theories.	This	empirical	foundation	explains	a	genuine	concern	about	actual	qualities	and	phenomena	in	the	world	in	contrast	to	the	more	metaphysical	and	cosmological	ideas	of	beauty	found	in	ancient	and	medieval	philosophy.5		 It	is	especially	useful	for	grasping	what	it	is	that	gives	natural	phenomena	aesthetic	value.	While	an	ideal	theory	of	beauty,	characterized	by	order,	harmony,	and	so	on	sits	nicely	with	a	holistic	concept	of	natural	beauty	–	perhaps	aligned	with	ecological	ideas	–	it	can	hide	our	lived,	immediate	experiences	of	the	natural	environment.	From	extraordinary	to	more	ordinary	encounters,	experience	through	the	senses,	I	would	argue,	must	form	the	starting	point	for	aesthetic	appreciation	of	nature.		 At	least	because	of	emerging	interest	in	the	science	of	human	nature	and	natural	history,	eighteenth-century	philosophers	in	Britain	and	the	Continent	write	generously	not	only	about	the	arts	but	also	the	natural	world.	‘Nature’	is	certainly	a	contested	concept,	and	in	the	eighteenth	century,	as	today,	it	has	many	meanings,	including	religious	ones.	For	example,	‘Nature’	with	an	upper	case	‘N’	is	used	by	Shaftesbury	to	denote	the	cosmological	whole	that	is	divine	creation.6	When	Nature	
																																																								4	The	term,	‘aesthetic’	did	not	come	into	usage	until	well	after	Alexander	Baumgarten’s	coinage	in	1735.	
5	Dabney	Townsend,	‘Lockean	Aesthetics’,	Journal	of	Aesthetics	and	Art	Criticism,	49	(1991),	349-361.	
6	Anthony	Ashley	Cooper,	third	Earl	of	Shaftesbury,	Characteristics	of	Men,	Manners,	Opinions,	Times,	ed.,	Lawrence	E.	Klein	(Cambridge,	1999).	Costelloe’s	discussion	of	divine	‘Nature’	in	Shaftesbury’s	
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is	used	for	the	natural	world	as	created	by	God,	for	Hutcheson,	Reid	and	other	contemporaries	this	also	included	‘nature’	with	a	small	‘n’,	an	empirical	reality	in	all	its	particularity	–	the	universe,	mountains,	rivers,	insects,	mammals,	plants,	and	natural	environments	of	sky,	sea,	and	land,	and	so	on.	In	the	philosophical	lineage	from	Shaftesbury	to	Hutcheson	and	Reid	we	find	a	stronger	empirical	basis	for	natural	beauty,	with	Hutcheson’s	‘more	earthy	empiricism’	and	Reid’s	‘common	sense’	philosophy	signaling	a	move	beyond	the	stronger	deism	of	Shaftesbury’s	approach.7	It	is	interesting	to	know	that	Reid	had	a	strong	interest	in	botany,	and	natural	history	more	generally,	having	studied	it	and	writing	a	text	on	the	subject.8	Of	course,	we	still	see	in	Hutcheson	and	Reid	an	anthropocentrism	inflected	with	deism,	which	is	to	say	that	God	is	the	final	cause,	and	the	non-human/non-divine	is	generally	considered	inferior	to	the	human	and	divine.			
The	Sense	of	Beauty		In	An	Inquiry	into	the	Original	of	Our	Ideas	of	Beauty	and	Virtue	(1726)	and	An	Essay	
On	the	Nature	and	Conduct	of	the	Passions	and	Affections	(1728),	Hutcheson	develops	the	idea	of	a	‘sense	of	beauty’,	which	he	compares	to	our	external	senses	of	
																																																																																																																																																																					aesthetics	is	insightful;	see,	Timothy	M.	Costelloe,	The	British	Aesthetic	Tradition:	From	Shaftesbury	to	
Wittgenstein,	(Cambridge,	2013),	13.	
7	Costelloe,	The	British	Aesthetic	Tradition,	22.	
8	See	Paul	Wood,	‘Introduction’	in,	Thomas	Reid	and	the	Animate	Creation:	Papers	Relating	to	the	Life	
Sciences,	ed.	Paul	Wood	(Edinburgh,	1995),	1-20.		
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sight	and	hearing.9	With	the	sense	of	beauty,	he	instantly	indicates	an	interest	in	qualities	of	the	world	as	the	basis	of	beauty	rather	than	metaphysical	ideas.	This	empiricist	approach	articulates	beauty	as	related	to	an	aesthetic	sense,	grasped	through	perception	that	is	immediate,	rather	than	mediated	by	cognition	or	knowledge:	‘Beauty	is	taken	for	the	Idea	rais’d	in	us,	and	our	Sense	of	Beauty	for	our	Power	of	receiving	this	Idea’.10	The	power	for	receiving	these	ideas	is	the	‘internal	sense’,	and	when	beauty	is	experienced	it	is	accompanied	by	pleasure.	This	internal	sense,	unlike	our	external	senses,	can	discern	beauty	in	non-extended	things	such	as	‘Theorems,	or	universal	truths,	in	general	Causes,	and	in	some	extensive	Principles	of	Action’.11	Like	the	external	senses,	the	internal	sense	is	natural	rather	than	acquired,	though	we	can	develop	the	capacity	and,	thus,	develop	aesthetic	taste.			 Although	influenced	by	Shaftesbury,	especially	in	aligning	aesthetics	with	morality,	Hutcheson	departs	from	his	cognitive,	neo-Platonist	approach.		Hutcheson’s	emphasis	on	perception	means	that	the	senses	show	us	the	way	to	beauty:	‘This	superior	Power	of	Perception	is	justly	called	a	Sense,	because	of	its	Affinity	to	the	other	Senses	in	this,	that	the	Pleasure	does	not	arise	from	any	Knowledge	of	Principles,	Proportions,	Causes,	or	of	the	Usefulness	of	the	Object;	but	
																																																								9	Francis	Hutcheson,	An	Inquiry	into	the	Original	of	Our	Ideas	of	Beauty	and	Virtue,	rev.	ed.,	ed.	Wolfgang	Leidhold	(Indianapolis,	2008),	hereafter	abbreviated	as	Inquiry;	Francis	Hutcheson,	An	
Essay	On	the	Nature	and	Conduct	of	the	Passions	and	Affections,	ed.	Aaron	Garrett	(Indianapolis,	2003).	
10	Inquiry,	23.	
11	Ibid.,	24.	
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strikes	us	at	first	with	the	Idea	of	Beauty…’12	The	way	in	which	Hutcheson	likens	our	perception	of	beauty	to	a	sense	underlines	the	non-cognitive	nature	of	his	approach.	The	external	senses	and	the	sense	of	beauty	are	not	concerned	with	reflection,	and	thus	knowledge	does	not	mediate	or	enable	the	perception	of	beauty:	‘a	dull	Critick,	or	one	of	the	Virtuosi….	can	tell	all	the	specific	Differences	of	Trees,	Herbs,	Minerals,	Metals;	they	know	the	Form	of	every	Leaf,	Stalk,	Root,	Flower,	and	Seed	of	all	the	Species,	about	which	the	Poet	is	often	ignorant:	And	yet	the	Poet	shall	have	a	vastly	more	delightful	Perception	of	the	Whole….the	most	accurate	Knowledge	of	what	the	External	Senses	discover,	often	does	not	give	the	Pleasure	of	Beauty…’.13			 With	no	role	for	reflection,	we	also	find	that	the	immediacy	of	the	sense	of	beauty	precludes	utility	and	self-interest	or	‘self-love’;	beauty	is	‘necessarily	pleasant	to	us,	as	well	as	immediately	so;	neither	can	any	Resolution	of	our	own,	nor	any	Prospect	or	Advantage	or	Disadvantage,	vary	the	Beauty	or	Deformity	of	an	Object…’14	The	pleasure	which	accompanies	beauty	is	‘distinct	from	that	Joy	which	arises	from	Self-love	upon	Prospect	of	Advantage.’15	Hutcheson	agrees	with	Shaftesbury	concerning	the	absence	of	practical	interest	in	matters	of	beauty,	but	this	is	expressed	more	emphatically	in	his	work.16	The	sense	of	beauty	is	characterized	by	disinterestedness,	a	concept	which	would	be	deeply	influential	on	
																																																								12	Ibid.,	25.	
13	Ibid.,	24.	
14	Ibid.,	25.	
15	Ibid.	
16	See	Shaftesbury,	Characteristics,	318-319.	
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the	aesthetic	tradition	which	followed	Hutcheson,	and	on	Kant	in	particular.17	Hutcheson	does	recognise	that	although	beauty	is	in	actual	fact	perceived	via	the	internal	sense	(with	accompanying	pleasure),	knowledge	about	the	object	and	its	uses	‘may	super-add	a	distinct	rational	Pleasure	from	prospects	of	Advantage,	or	from	the	Increase	of	Knowledge.’18	When	knowledge	is	fed	in,	while	it	can	embellish	appreciation	it	does	not	form	its	foundation.			 Overall,	we	find	an	argument	that	our	power	to	perceive	ideas	of	beauty	is	based	in	an	‘internal	sense’	comparable	to	our	external	senses.	Beauty	is	experienced	through	the	subject’s	perception	of	objects	in	the	world	or	non-extended	things	such	as	mathematical	ideas.	As	disinterested,	our	grasp	of	beauty	is	non-reflective,	non-cognitive,	and	non-practical;	bound	up	with	perception	and	feeling	rather	than	rationality.	In	the	next	section,	I	consider	‘absolute	beauty’	and	how	this	type	of	beauty	is	concerned	with	nature.		
Absolute	Beauty	and	Nature	
	Hutcheson	makes	an	important	distinction	concerning	beauty:	‘Beauty	is	either	Original	or	Comparative…Absolute,	or	Relative…by	Absolute	Beauty	understand	only	that	Beauty,	which	we	perceive	in	Objects	without	comparison	to	any	thing	external,	of	which	the	Object	suppos’d	an	Imitation,	or	Picture;	such	as	that	Beauty																																																									17	Miles	Rind,	‘The	Concept	of	Disinterestedness	in	Eighteenth-Century	British	Aesthetics’,	Journal	of	
the	History	of	Philosophy,	41	(2002),	67-87.	
18	Inquiry,	25	
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perceiv’d	from	the	Works	of	Nature,	artificial	Forms,	Figures,	Theorems.	Comparative	or	Relative	Beauty	is	that	which	we	perceive	in	Objects,	commonly	considered	as	Imitations	or	Resemblances	of	something	else.’19	‘Original’	or	‘absolute’	beauty	is	non-representational,	it	does	not	imitate	anything,	and	is	not	beautiful	in	relation	to	anything	else.	Comparative	or	relative	beauty	is	imitative	of	things,	and	the	arts	are	characteristically	imitative	or	representational	(in	Hutcheson’s	time,	at	least).20	For	example,	consider	a	painting	of	a	peach	versus	the	peach	itself,	or	a	poem	about	clouds,	versus	clouds	themselves.	Gardens	make	an	appearance	in	his	chapter	on	relative	beauty,	most	certainly	because	they	are	designed	(in	many	cases	strongly	so,	as	we	see	in	the	French	style	of	formal	gardens).		 Absolute	beauty	operates	not	as	an	objective	quality	and	more	like	a	secondary	quality	(after	Locke):	‘Beauty,	like	other	Names	of	sensible	Ideas,	properly	denotes	the	Perception	of	some	Mind;	so	Cold,	Hot,	Sweet,	Bitter,	denote	Sensations	in	our	Minds,	to	which	perhaps	there	is	no	resemblance	in	the	Objects,	which	excite	these	ideas	in	us,	however	we	generally	imagine	that	there	is	something	in	the	Object	just	like	our	Perception	….	were	there	no	Mind	with	a	Sense	of	Beauty	to	contemplate	Objects,	I	see	not	how	they	could	be	call'd	beautiful.’21	
																																																								19	Ibid.,26-27.	
20	Natural	beauty	also	features	as	comparative	beauty	but	only	to	the	extent	that	we	see	God’s	systematic	work	as	creator;	see	Inquiry,	45.	I	agree	with	Kivy’s	interpretation	here	that	natural	beauty	is	principally	absolute	beauty;	see	The	Seventh	Sense,	96-97.	
21	Inquiry,	27.	
	 10	
Beauty	is	always	relational	in	this	way,	that	is,	it	always	depends	upon	an	internal	sense	–	the	human	mind,	perception	and	an	idea	of	beauty	as	arising	in	the	mind	from	some	cause.	That	idea	is	closely	associated	with	a	feeling	of	pleasure	in	the	subject	as	well.	So,	there	is	a	clear	emphasis	on	beauty	in	relation	to	the	subject	and,	as	we	shall	see,	it	is	a	point	that	Reid	found	objectionable.		 Hutcheson	identifies	three	kinds	of	absolute	beauty:	natural	beauty,	the	beauty	of	theorems,	and	the	beauty	of	art	that	is	not	imitative	or	representational.	When	the	idea	of	beauty	is	aroused	in	us,	we	experience	pleasure.	What	is	it	about	the	qualities	of	objects	that	causes	pleasure?	Absolute	beauty	is	occasioned	by	what	Hutcheson	calls	‘uniformity	amidst	variety’.	In	arguing	the	case	for	this	universal	feature	of	beauty,	a	deep	interest	in	mathematical	forms	is	shown;	his	presentation	of	examples	begins	with	them	because	they	are	‘simpler	Kinds…and	we	may	perhaps	find	that	the	same	foundation	extends	to	all	the	more	complex	Species	of	it.’22	His	articulation	of	uniformity	amidst	variety is	itself	mathematical,	as	Paul	Guyer	points	out:	‘greater	beauty	can	be	produced	either	by	greater	variety	when	uniformity	is	constant	or	greater	uniformity	when	variety	is	constant.’23	Additionally,	we	find	that	the	beauty	of	theorems	is	distinguished	from	other	kinds	of	absolute	beauty,	at	least	because	‘there	is	none	which	we	shall	see	such	an	amazing	Variety	with	Uniformity’.24	Although	Hutcheson	by	no	means	discusses	
																																																								22	Ibid.,	28.	
23	Paul	Guyer,	A	History	of	Modern	Aesthetics.	Volume	1:	The	Eighteenth	Century	(Cambridge,	2014),	106.	
24	Inquiry,	36.	
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mathematical	forms	exclusively,	by	his	lights	they	seem	to	provide	exemplars	of	uniformity	amidst	variety	in	absolute	beauty.			 In	explaining	natural	beauty	and	arguing	for	uniformity	amidst	variety,	Hutcheson’s	method	is	empirical;	a	range	of	examples	of	things	that	have	uniformity	amidst	variety	is	presented.	It	is	a	systematic	too,	with	his	section	on	‘Beauty	in	nature’	beginning	with	the	universe	and	the	uniformity	amidst	variety	of	spherical	planets,	elliptical	orbits,	regularity	of	changes	in	daylight	and	seasons,	and	other	phenomena	of	the	atmosphere	and	universe.	Hutcheson	moves	from	the	heavens	above	to	the	earth	below,	with	sections	ordered	by	headings:	‘Earth’,	‘Plants’,	‘Animals’,	‘Proportion’,	‘Fowls’,	‘Fluids’,	‘Harmony’	(in	music,	which	he	takes	to	be	non-representational).25			 To	understand	how	uniformity	amidst	variety	works	in	natural	beauty,	consider	plants	and	birds,	consider	two	of	his	examples.	Amongst	the	great	variety	of	plants,	we	find	uniformity,	according	to	Hutcheson,	in	the	way	they	grow	and	propagate,	and	also	in	their	structure,	especially	if	seen	under	a	magnifying	glass.	‘In	the	almost	infinite	Multitude	of	Leaves,	Fruit,	Seed,	Flowers	of	any	one	Species,	we	often	see	an	exact	Uniformity	in	the	Structure	and	Situation	of	the	smallest	Fibres.	This	is	the	Beauty	which	charms	an	ingenious	Botanist.’26	Likewise,	there	are	many	species	of	birds	that	differ	because	of	their	variety	of	colours	and	feathers,	yet	all	have	feathers	that	are	structurally	similar	across	species.	In	any	particular	bird,	we	may	also	find	a	variety	of	colours,	yet	here	too	those	colours	are	displayed	in																																																									25	Ibid.,	30-34.	
26	Ibid.,	32.	
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feathers	which	have	a	uniform	shape	and	grow	from	the	body	in	a	uniform	rather	than	disordered	way,	for	example,	on	each	wing,	symmetrically.27	Hutcheson’s	discussion	of	animals	is	noteworthy	in	so	far	as	he	observes	their	beauty	in	motion,	as	living	creatures,	rather	than	merely	specimens,	‘walking,	running,	flying,	swimming’.	He	does	not	venture	further	beyond	visual	interest	in	natural	beauty,	however.	Although	he	discusses	harmony	in	music,	or	‘Beauty	of	Sound’,	he	does	not	consider	natural	sounds	such	as	birdsong	or	waterfalls.28	This	is	disappointing	because	aesthetic	appreciation	of	nature	potentially	draws	on	more	senses	compared	to	the	arts	and	Hutcheson,	unlike	later	philosophers,	does	not	take	an	interest	in	this.29			 The	method	used	by	Hutcheson	for	examining	natural	beauty	begins	with	forms	and	patterns	that	we	understand	through	astronomy	and	other	sciences,	yet	he	is	clear	that	uniformity	amidst	variety	is	experienced	through	the	sense	of	beauty	rather	than	through	knowledge,	thereby	maintaining	a	non-cognitive	view	of	beauty:	‘This	Delight	which	accompanys	Sciences,	or	Universal	Theorems,	may	really	be	call’d	a	kind	of	Sensation;	since	it	necessarily	accompanys	the	Discovery	of	any	Proposition,	and	is	distinct	from	bare	Knowledge	it	self....’30	In	closing	his	discussion	of	absolute	beauty	of	nature,	he	emphasises	that	our	experience	of	uniformity	
																																																								27	Ibid.,	34.	
28	Ibid.	
29	See,	for	example,	work	by	Edmund	Burke	and	Archibald	Alison	on	the	sublime,	as	discussed	in	Brady,	The	Sublime	in	Modern	Philosophy.	
30	Inquiry,	40.	
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amidst	variety	does	not	arise	from	reflection	and,	‘We	may	have	the	Sensation	without	knowing	what	is	the	Occasion	of	it’.31	This	last	point	is	especially	interesting,	for	it	shows	that	natural	beauty	does	not	seem	to	require	special	expertise.	Later	in	the	Inquiry,	we	see	this	democratic	tendency	reappear.	In	contrast	to	enjoying	the	arts,	natural	beauty	may	be	enjoyed	widely,	not	requiring	a	position	of	wealth	or	power:	‘Contemplation	of	the	Works	of	Nature,	is	expos’d	to	every	one	without	Expence;	the	Poor	and	the	Low,	may	have	as	free	a	use	of	these	Objects,	in	this	way,	as	the	Wealthy	or	Powerful.’32	We	will	see	a	similar	generosity	in	Reid’s	account,	and	for	both	philosophers,	the	explanation	is	that	beauty	is	linked	to	perception	and	feeling,	rather	than	knowledge.		 The	immediacy	of	our	perception	of	beauty	and	its	disinterested	character	is	an	essential	first	step	in	formulating	the	foundation	of	the	moral	sense	for	Hutcheson,	though	he	takes	the	sense	of	beauty	and	moral	sense	to	be	distinct.	Beauty	is	independent,	not	subsumed	by	the	moral,	but	nonetheless	the	two	sentiments	are	intimately	connected.	His	generous	view	of	just	what	may	be	available	in	terms	of	beauty	to	any	person	can	be	explained	at	least	because	he	is	striving	to	provide	an	account	of	beauty	in	preparation	for	his	defense	of	the	moral	sense,	where	self-interest	is	absent	from	both.			 This	raises	the	question	of	the	extent	to	which	Hutcheson’s	views	about	natural	beauty	are	shaped	by	his	broader	philosophical	aim	of	arguing	against	Hobbesian	egoism.	One	might	take	the	view	that	it	is	easier	to	provide	an	account	of																																																									31	Ibid.,	35.	
32	Ibid.,	77;	see	also,	Essay,	74.	
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beauty	as	grounded	in	disinterested	pleasure	with	respect	to	beauty	that	is	not	a	sign	of	wealth	or	power;	beauty	that	does	not	have	a	price	tag.	Natural	beauty	is	perceived	to	be	of	this	kind,	not	owned	or	possessed.	In	the	Essay,	Hutcheson	is	clear	that	the	poet	or	connoisseur	of	art	or	nature,	rather	than	the	possessor	of	it,	has	a	‘higher	taste’.33	He	cites	Horace	to	underline	this	point	about	nature’s	significance	in	this	respect,	‘Is	the	grass	poorer	in	fragrance	or	beauty	than	Libyan	mosaics?	Is	the	water	purer	which	in	city-streets	struggles	to	burst	its	leaden	pipes	than	that	which	dances	and	purls	adown	the	sloping	brooks?’	In	this	regard,	consider	mathematical	theorems.	Are	they	owned	or	possessed?	Do	they	give	us	advantage?	Here	too,	it	appears	easier	to	make	a	case	for	a	disinterested	concept	of	beauty	by	providing	evidence	of	this	kind.			 While	there	is	certainly	something	to	this	sort	of	argument,	it	does	not	sufficiently	acknowledge	other	features	of	Hutcheson’s	account	of	absolute	beauty,	which	is	to	say	that	his	interest	in	natural	beauty	does	not	function	simply	to	serve	his	argument	for	the	moral	sense.	First,	Hutcheson	shows	a	genuine	interest	in	harmony	and	order,	and	his	account	of	natural	beauty	as	linked	to	unity	amidst	variety	turns	out	to	be	holistic,	prioritizing	unities	above	particulars.	For	this	reason,	natural	beauty	is	conceived,	arguably,	more	narrowly	than	we	see	in	Reid’s	approach	(more	on	this	below).34	Second,	beauty	as	uniformity	amidst	variety,	together	with	several	mentions	of	harmony,	suggests	a	strong	emphasis	on	order	in	his	theory.	That	order	is	not	accidental,	and	though	Hutcheson	genuinely	finds	it	in																																																									33	Essay,	114	(English	translation	appears	in	note	34).		
34	Cf.	Kivy,	The	Seventh	Sense,	99.		
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nature,	in	our	appreciation	of	birds	or	planetary	movements,	it	is	ultimately	down	to	a	divine	cause.	Certainly,	then,	Hutcheson	holds	up	natural	beauty	as	worthy	of	appreciation	in	its	own	right,	even	if	his	approach	is	wanting	in	its	attention	to	particulars	and	to	the	more	multisensory	dimension	of	aesthetic	appreciation	of	nature.	I	now	turn	to	a	discussion	of	Reid’s	ideas	on	the	sense	of	beauty,	and	natural	beauty,	before	discussing	the	relevance	of	each	philosopher’s	ideas	for	contemporary	debates.		 		
Reid:	Natural	Beauty	and	Aesthetic	Realism		Reid’s	theory	of	taste,	appears	in	his	essay,	‘Of	Taste’,	in	his	Essays	on	the	Intellectual	
Powers	of	Man	(1785),	and	this	text	will	be	my	focus.35	It	is	not	my	intention	to	suggest	that	he	offers	theory	of	natural	beauty	as	such;	rather,	among	eighteenth-century	aesthetic	theories	his	approach,	like	Hutcheson’s,	is	well	suited	to	thinking	about	natural	aesthetics.	I	shall	argue,	though,	that	his	aesthetic	realism	is	especially	instructive	with	respect	to	aesthetic	appreciation	of	nature.	This	more	realist	approach	to	beauty	is	grounded	in	his	theory	of	perception	and	his	common	sense	epistemology,	which	he	uses	to	oppose	Hutcheson’s	subjectivism.			 Like	Hutcheson	and	others	falling	under	his	influence,	Reid	explains	beauty	through	a	kind	of	internal	sense	that	discerns	beauty.	He	also	recognises	the	role	of	feeling,	pleasure	and	displeasure,	in	our	experience	of	beauty,	and	how	different																																																									35	Reid	also	wrote	on	the	arts,	but	this	is	less	relevant	for	thinking	about	natural	beauty;	see	Thomas	Reid,	On	Logic,	Rhetoric	and	the	Fine	Arts,	ed.	Alexander	Broadie,	(Edinburgh,	2005).		
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backgrounds	and	experiences	shape	our	responses	to	beautiful	things.	Reid	sets	out	the	standard	principles	of	taste	–	beauty,	grandeur	(or	sublimity),	and	novelty	–	with	deformity	or	ugliness	appearing	as	a	form	of	aesthetic	disvalue.	Taste	is	defined	as:				 That	power	of	the	mind	by	which	we	are	capable	of	discerning	and	relishing		 the	beauties	of	Nature,	and	whatever	is	excellent	in	the	fine	arts…The		 external	sense	of	taste,	by	which	we	distinguish	and	relish	the	various	kinds		 of	food,	has	given	occasion	to	a	metaphorical	application	of	its	name	to	this		 internal	power	of	the	mind,	by	which	we	perceive	what	is	beautiful,	and	what		 is	deformed	or	defective	in	the	various	objects	we	contemplate.36		Here	we	see	an	interest	in	both	natural	and	artistic	beauty,	and	his	analogy	to	the	external	senses	follows	the	contours	of	Hutcheson’s	account.	Reid	then	builds	a	different,	more	realist	picture	of	beauty	through	his	understanding	of	aesthetic	qualities	as	‘excellences,’	and	how	these	excellences	are	perceived:	‘When	I	hear	an	air	in	music	that	pleases	me,	I	say,	it	is	fine,	it	is	excellent.	This	excellence	is	not	in	me;	it	is	in	the	music.	But	the	pleasure	it	gives	is	not	in	the	music;	it	is	in	me…’.37	Reid	wants	to	emphasise	that	beauty	is	not	found	in	the	mind	or	feelings	of	the	
																																																								36	Thomas	Reid,	Essays	on	the	Intellectual	Powers	of	Man,	ed.	Derek	Brookes	(Edinburgh,	2002),	573	(abbreviated,	hereafter,	as	EIP).	
37	EIP,	574		
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experiencing	subject,	and	it	is	not	an	idea	raised	via	perception.	Rather,	beauty	is	perceived	and	is	occasioned	by	‘excellences’	of	aesthetic	objects.			 Now,	as	Hutcheson	also	points	up,	we	might	not	always	be	able	to	say	just	what	it	is	that	makes	something	beautiful	when	we	ascribe	beauty	to	it:	‘Perhaps	I	cannot	say	what	it	is	in	the	tune	that	pleases	my	ear,	as	I	cannot	say	what	it	is	[in]	a	sapid	body	which	pleases	my	palate;	but	there	is	a	quality	in	the	sapid	body	which	pleases	my	palate…and	there	is	a	quality	in	the	tune	that	pleases	my	taste….’.38	Nonetheless,	we	can	be	certain	that	we	have	found	something	of	aesthetic	merit.	In	comparing	our	aesthetic	perception	to	the	other	senses,	Reid	thinks	that	we	can	be	as	certain	in	our	ascription	of	some	excellence	to	an	object	through	aesthetic	perception	as	we	are	in	finding	something	delicious	through	gustatory	taste.	Much	of	the	time	though,	Reid	thinks	that	we	are	in	fact	able	to	discern	and	identify	excellences	and,	in	noting	this,	it	is	clear	that	he	recognizes	a	range	of	ways	we	may	respond	aesthetically:	‘In	some	cases,	that	superior	excellence	is	distinctly	perceived	and	can	be	pointed	out,	in	other	cases,	we	have	only	a	general	notion	of	some	excellence	which	we	cannot	describe’.39		 Reid’s	points	here	are	in	step	with	his	more	general	theory	of	perception,	which	says	that	our	perceptual	engagement	with	the	world	is	direct	and	immediate.																																																									38	Ibid.	
39	Ibid.,	578.	Reid’s	point	here	is	shaped	by	his	particular	understanding	of	secondary	qualities,	as	Roger	Gallie	notes,	‘our	senses	only	give	us	a	relative	and	obscure	notion	of	secondary	qualities.	They	inform	us	only	that	secondary	qualities	are	unknown	qualities	that	affect	us	in	a	certain	way’;	see,	Roger	D.	Gallie,	Thomas	Reid:	Ethics,	Aesthetics	and	the	Anatomy	of	the	Self,	(Dordrecht,	1998),	5.	These	kinds	of	qualities	appear	to	be,	nonetheless,	directly	perceived	on	Reid’s	account.		
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Famously,	he	objected	to	the	‘way	of	ideas’	of	Descartes,	Locke,	and	others,	dispensing	with	a	representational	theory	of	perception	where	the	object	of	perception	was	a	mental	representation	of	a	thing	rather	than	the	thing	itself.		In	perceiving	a	quality,	we	do	not	form	an	intermediary	idea	upon	which	a	belief	is	formed;	rather,	belief	is	enfolded	in	the	sensation	which	forms	a	part	of	any	perception.	In	perception	of	beauty,	this	amounts	to	an	aesthetic	judgment	of	some	excellence	in	a	landscape,	poem,	and	so	on:	‘When	a	man	pronounces	a	poem	or	palace	to	be	beautiful,	he	affirms	something	of	that	poem	or	that	palace;	and	every	affirmation	or	denial	expresses	judgment.	For	we	cannot	better	define	judgment,	than	by	saying	that	it	is	an	affirmation	or	denial	of	one	thing	concerning	another.	I	had	occasion	to	show,	when	treating	of	judgment,	that	it	is	implied	in	every	perception	of	our	external	senses.	There	is	an	immediate	conviction	and	belief	of	the	existence	of	the	quality	perceived,	whether	it	be	colour,	sound,		or	figure;	and	the	same	thing	holds	in	the	perception	of	beauty	and		deformity.’40	To	underline	that	we	directly	perceive	excellence	in	objects,	Reid	points	to	the	way	language	reveals	the	convention	for	which	we	ascribe	beauty	to	objects	rather	than	to	feelings	in	ourselves,	insisting,	in	this	way,	that	aesthetic	subjectivism	is	mistaken.	Importantly,	our	perception	of	excellences	is	evident	from	the	aesthetic	counterpart,	as	it	were,	of	our	common	sense.	The	ways	we	speak	about	beauty	reveal	that	it	is	not	something	internal	to	ourselves:			
																																																								40	Ibid.,	577.	
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	 My	language,	according	to	the	necessary	rules	of	construction,	can	bear		 no	other	meaning	but	this,	that	there	is	something	in	the	poem,	and	not		 in	me,	which	I	call	beauty.	Even	those	who	hold	beauty	to	be	merely	a	feeling		 in	the	person	that	perceives	it,	find	themselves	under	a	necessity	of		 expressing	themselves,	as	if	beauty	were	solely	a	quality	of	the	object,	and		 not	the	percipient…..No	reason	can	be	given	why	all	mankind	should	express		 themselves	thus,	but	that	they	believe	what	they	say.	It	is	therefore	contrary		 to	the		universal	sense	of	mankind,	expressed	by	their	language,	that	beauty		 is	not		 really	in	the	object,	but	is	merely	a	feeling	in	the	person	who	is	said	to		 receive	it.41			The	linguistic	dimension	of	our	aesthetic	experiences	seems	to	be	deeply	important	for	Reid	in	so	far	as	it	reveals	beauty	as	something	we	converse	about,	point	to,	and	recognize	as	real,	found	in	qualities	in	the	world.	42			 These	ideas	mark	Reid	out	from	the	more	idealist	and	subjectivist	leanings	of	his	two	main	influences,	Shaftesbury	and	Hutcheson.	As	noted	above,	Reid	interprets	Hutcheson	as	strongly	subjectivist,	as	if	beauty	could	only	be	identified	with	a	feeling	of	disinterested	pleasure	in	the	subject.	While	I	agree	with	
																																																								41	Ibid.;	see	also,	EIP,	584.	
42	By	contrast,	Reid’s	view	of	grandeur	(the	sublime)	appears	to	be	less	direct	and	objective.	Grandeur	‘is	found	originally	and	properly	in	qualities	of	the	mind…discerned	in	objects	of	sense	only	by	reflection…those	who	look	for	grandeur	in	mere	matter,	seek	the	living	along	the	dead’;	EIP,	591.	
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commentators	who	argue	that	Reid	may	interpret	Hutcheson’s	theory	as	overly	subjective,	an	important	difference	between	their	positions	can	still	be	detected.43			 Now,	Reid	must	also	give	some	role	to	the	mind	behind	perception	of	beauty	and	the	pleasure	felt	in	response.	He	explains	that	excellences	originate	in	the	minds	that	create	them:	in	the	case	of	art,	signs	refer	to	the	excellence	of	the	artist’s	mind,	and	for	nature,	to	the	excellence	of	God’s	mind.44		In	all	cases,	ultimately,	excellences	originate	in	the	divine	mind.	What	can	this	mean?	What	place	does	Reid	assign	to	mind	and	feeling	in	the	perception	of	beauty?	As	part	of	his	argument	for	not	reducing	excellences	to	minds,	Reid	holds	that	excellences	are	related	to	the	
structure	of	objects,	to	some	‘arrangement	of	qualities’;	they	are	what	he	calls	‘signs’	of	excellences	in	minds,	and	are	not	merely	mental	qualities.	I	shall	return	to	this	point	below.		 It	would	be	too	hasty,	however,	to	conclude	that	beauty	does	not	belong	to	art	or	nature	in	any	real	sense	and	must	somehow	always	refer	beyond	itself	to	some	mind.	Even	if	excellences	as	objective,	value-laden	qualities	have	the	quasi-mental	status	Reid	assigns	to	them,	they	remain	the	source	of	beauty	and	the																																																									43	See	Emily	Michael’s	discussion	in,	‘Francis	Hutcheson	on	Aesthetic	Perception	and	Aesthetic	Pleasure’,	British	Journal	of	Aesthetics,	24	(1984),	241-255.	
44	Even	if	God	is	the	final	cause,	the	natural	world,	natural	order	and	natural	laws	are	best	explained	through	Newtonian	science,	on	Reid’s	view.	We	know	that	Reid	read,	understood,	and	taught	Newton’s	writings’,	even	if	he	did	not	always	agree	with	his	ideas;	see,	Ryan	Nichols	and	Gideon	Yaffe,	‘Thomas	Reid’,	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	(Summer	2015	Edition),	Edward	N.	Zalta	(ed.),	URL	=	<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/reid/>.	Accessed	1/7/15;	Wood,	‘Introduction’	in	Thomas	Reid.	
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pleasurable	feeling	associated	with	it.	Beauty	is	perceived	through	excellences	and	signs,	but	it	is	not	reduced	to	them.	Following	a	discussion	about	why	the	idea	of	secondary	qualities	is	mistaken	and	how	this	mistake	has	shaped	theories	of	taste	(in	particular,	Hutcheson’s),	Reid	writes,	‘The	sense	of	beauty	may	be	analysed	in	a	manner	very	similar	to	the	sense	of	sweetness.	It	is	an	agreeable	feeling	or	emotion,	accompanied	with	an	opinion	or	judgment	of	some	excellence	in	the	object,	which	is	fitted	by	Nature	to	produce	that	feeling….the	use	of	all	language	shows,	that	the	name	of	beauty	belongs	to	this	excellence	of	the	object,	and	not	to	the	feelings	of	the	spectator.’	45	Peter	Kivy’s	interpretation	of	Reid’s	resistance	to	subjectivism	about	beauty	is	instructive:	‘Reid	was	insisting	on	the	objective	existence	of	aesthetic	qualities	in	the	strong	sense….For	Reid,	I	suggest,	the	world	was	nondispositionally	colored	and	aesthetic.’46			 Reid’s	emphasis	on	perception	and	language,	on	our	sense	that	beauty	lies	in	things,	and	belongs	to	things,	shapes	an	aesthetic	realism	driven	less	by	metaphysics	and	more	by	common	sense.47	Beauty	in	some	ways	might	be	said	to	‘track’	common	sense,	in	so	far	as	we	can	have	a	direct	and	self-evident	grasp	of	it.48	This	kind	of	approach	places	the	qualities	of	nature	and	artworks	front	and	center	in	a	different																																																									45	EIP,	594;	see	also,	Reid’s	mention	of	Hutcheson’s	remarks	here.	
46	Kivy,	The	Seventh	Sense,	172;	see	also,	Copenhaver	‘Thomas	Reid	and	Aesthetic	Perception’,	136,	on	secondary	qualities	as	properties	of	objects.	
47	See	Zuckert,	‘Thomas	Reid’s	‘Expressivist	Aesthetics’;	Dabney	Townsend,	‘Thomas	Reid	and	the	Theory	of	Taste’,	Journal	of	Aesthetics	and	Art	Criticism,	61	(2003),	346.	
48	Another	way	of	putting	this,	perhaps	more	strongly,	is	that	there	are	‘first	principles’	of	taste,	in	the	sense	that	Reid	understands	this	notion;	see	Gallie,	Thomas	Reid,	151.	
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way	than	Hutcheson’s	theory,	and	moves	beyond	the	close	association	of	beauty	with	the	subject	and	their	pleasure.	Given	Reid’s	contrasting	picture	of	the	aesthetic	subject,	where	does	this	leave	the	concept	of	disinterestedness?		 Reid	does	not	explicitly	discuss	the	concept,	as	we	find	in	Hutcheson,	but	he	does	recognise	beauty’s	independence	from	utility.	The	pleasure	that	accompanies	beauty	‘gives	value	to	the	object,	abstracted	from	its	utility’.	With	possessions,	beauty	‘greatly	enhances	the	price’,	but	this	is	not	all,	‘A	beautiful	dog…is	valued	by	its	owner	and	by	others,	not	only	for	its	utility,	but	for	its	beauty.’49	By	the	time	Reid	was	setting	out	his	theory	of	taste,	beauty’s	independence	from	utility	had	become	well	established,	so	I	would	speculate	that	he	felt	no	need	to	give	disinterestedness	special	attention.	This	could	also	be	explained	by	the	fact	that,	as	we	have	seen,	Reid	makes	a	sharper	separation	between	beauty	and	pleasure	than	Hutcheson.		Our	perception	of	beauty	gives	rise	to	a	judgment	about	the	object’s	value	(recall	that	for	Reid,	belief	is	wrapped	into	perception	in	a	more	direct	way).	In	this	way,	we	see	that	the	ground	of	the	judgment	seems	to	be	perception	of	the	object	rather	than	an	immediate	feeling	of	pleasure	in	the	subject.	If	this	is	how	the	perception	of	beauty	works,	then	aesthetic	value	is	not	dependent	on	pleasure,	but	only	on	the	perception	of	qualities	in	objects.50	The	upshot	is	that	aesthetic	qualities	become	especially	important,	with	less	emphasis	on	pleasure	in	the	subject.	In	the	next	section,	I	consider	how	this	approach	to	taste	and	beauty	shapes	his	ideas	about	natural	
																																																								49	EIP,	591.		50	Ibid.	
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beauty,	before	turning	to	the	relevance	of	his	aesthetic	realism	for	contemporary	discussions.	
Instinctive	and	Rational	Judgments	of	Beauty			Generally	speaking,	like	Hutcheson,	Reid	thinks	that	we	are	naturally	fitted	to	experience	beauty	and	ascribe	aesthetic	qualities	to	things,	that	is,	to	perceive	their	excellences	and	feel	pleasure	in	response.	‘Some	objects	strike	us	at	once,	and	appear	beautiful	at	first	sight,	without	any	reflection,	without	our	being	able	to	say	why	we	call	them	beautiful,	or	being	able	to	specify	any	perfection	which	justifies	our	judgment…..In	the	plumage	of	birds,	and	of	butterflies,	in	the	colors	and	form	of	flowers,	of	shells,	and	of	many	other	objects,	we	perceive	a	beauty	that	delights;	but	cannot	say	what	it	is	in	the	object	that	should	produce	that	emotion.’51		 In	recognizing	this	kind	of	response,	Reid	points	to	a	capacity	to	experience	beauty	immediately	that	will	be	available	to	children	and	adults,	amateurs	and	experts	alike.	He	even	suggests	that	non-human	species	also	possess	the	aesthetic	sense,	using	it	in	sexual	selection	and	in	looking	after	offspring,	quoting	Addison	at	length	on	how	birds	may	exhibit	the	sense	of	beauty	in	courtship.52	This	sense	of	beauty	is	described	as	‘instinctive’,	and	he	illustrates	it	in	this	way:	‘In	a	heap	of	pebbles,	one	that	is	remarkable	for	brilliancy	of	colour	and	regularity	of	figure,	will	be	picked	out	of	the	heap	by	a	child.	He	perceives	beauty	in	it,	puts	a	value	upon	it,	and	is	fond	of	the	property	of	it.	For	this	preference,	no	reason	can	be	given,	but	that																																																									51	Ibid.,	596.	
52	Ibid.,	596-597.	
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children	are,	by	their	constitution,	fond	of	brilliant	colors,	and	of	regular	figures…’.53	Reid	makes	a	distinction	between	this	instinctive	sense	or	judgment	of	beauty	and	a	more	developed	one,	which	he	calls	a	‘rational’	judgment	of	beauty.	In	rational	judgments	we	are	able	to	identify	relevant	qualities	and	provide	reasons	or	an	explanation	for	our	judgment.	The	quality	of	the	object	is	‘distinctly	conceived,	and	may	be	specified’:					 The	beauties	of	the	field,	of	the	forest,	and	of	the	flower-garden,	strike	a	child		 long	before	he	can	reason.	He	is	delighted	with	what	he	sees;	but	he	knows		 not	why.	This	is	instinct,	but	it	is	not	confined	to	childhood;	it	continues		 through	all	the	stages	of	life.	It	leads	the	florist,	the	botanist,	the	philosopher,		 to	examine	and	compare	the	objects	which	Nature,	by	this	powerful	instinct,		 recommends	to	his	attention.	By	degrees,	he	becomes	a	critic	in	beauties	of		 this	kind,	and	can	give	a	reason	why	he	prefers	one	to	another.	In	every		 species,	he	sees	the	greatest	beauty	in	the		plants	or	flowers	that	are	most		 perfect	in	their	kind	—	which	have	neither	suffered	from	unkindly	soil		 nor	inclement	weather;	which	have	not	been	robbed	of	their	nourishment	by		 other	plants,	nor	hurt	by	any	accident.54		
																																																								53	Ibid.,	598.	Reid	may	have	been	making	an	implicit	reference	to	Hutcheson’s	remark	that	children	tend	to	like	‘simpler’	and	‘regular’	figures	(Inquiry,	30).	
54	EIP,	607.	
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It	is	important	to	understand	that	this	is	the	only	sense	in	which	he	thinks	that	aesthetic	judgments	are	‘rational’.	Reasoning	is	not	the	basis	of	aesthetic	experience	and	we	do	not	arrive	at	aesthetic	judgments	through	reasoning,	say,	as	if	we	could	deduce	beauty	in	some	way	from	a	set	of	qualities	in	objects.	The	sense	in	which	experience	of	beauty	is	rational	tracks	his	common	sense	idea	that	perception	includes	belief.	Knowledge	will	play	some	role,	certainly,	and	more	so	than	we	see	in	Hutcheson’s	account.55	The	appreciator	with	more	experience	of	some	aesthetic	object	will	potentially	experience	greater	beauty,	able	to	grasp	why	the	object	has	aesthetic	value	and	able	to	make	comparisons	to	other	beauties.			 On	first	glance,	it	might	seem	that	appreciators	lacking	experience	and	knowledge	have	shallow	experiences	of	beauty,	but	I	do	not	think	this	is	what	Reid	means	to	say.56	Reid,	like	Hutcheson,	sketches	a	democratic	picture	of	the	capacity	to	experience	beauty	–	from	the	experience	of	the	child,	to	an	adult	lacking	experience	of	something,	to	an	adult	who	has	acquired	more	understanding	through	greater	experience	of	the	aesthetic	object	or	through	specialist	knowledge.	It	is	noteworthy	that	his	list	of	experienced	appreciators	of	flower-gardens	does	not	privilege	scientific	knowledge	over	other	ways	in	which	we	might	develop	the	capacity	to	make	rational	judgments	of	beauty.	The	florist	and	the	botanist	are	on	equal	footing:	the	florist,	with	extensive	sensory	experience	of	flowers	and	formal	
																																																								55	Cf.	Kivy,	The	Seventh	Sense,	158-168.	I	would	argue	against	an	interpretation	of	Reid’s	theory	as	a	type	of	‘rationalist	aesthetics’	(or,	even,	without	qualification,	‘empiricist	aesthetics’).	It	is	a	distinctive	aesthetic	theory,	strongly	shaped	by	his	complex	epistemology.	
56	Cf.	Copenhaver,	‘Thomas	Reid	and	Aesthetic	Perception’.	
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arrangements	of	them;	and	the	botantist,	with	their	specialised	scientific	knowledge	of	plants.	We	have	also	seen	that	the	sense	of	instinctive	beauty	extends	to	non-humans	animals.57		 In	addition,	it	is	certainly	the	case	that	the	instinctive	judgment	of	beauty	is	a	kind	of	aesthetic	judgment	in	its	own	right.	It	is	a	judgment	of	aesthetic	merit,	where	beauty	strikes	us,	even	if	we	cannot	pin	it	down	to	particular	qualities.	The	passages	quoted	above	provide	evidence	of	the	child’s	capacity	to	experience	beauty	in	this	way,	perceiving	aesthetic	qualities	and	experiencing	pleasure.	So,	while	greater	beauty	might	follow	with	more	experience,	this	does	not	seem	to	diminish	the	
quality	of	these	experiences	and	the	judgments	that	we	make.	They	are	not	necessarily	superficial,	being	only	of	a	different	kind.	Reid	holds	that	instinctive	judgments	cannot	be	true	or	false,	the	standard	of	taste	which	he	holds	for	rational	judgments,	because	if	we	cannot	pin	down	the	qualities	which	strike	us	as	beautiful,	it	will	be	more	difficult	to	provide	an	explanation	for	our	judgment.			 In	light	of	these	points,	we	find	that	Reid’s	distinction	not	only	identifies	but	is	also	able	to	capture	the	broad	range	of	our	aesthetic	responses	to	nature,	from	being	struck	by	we	know	not	what	to	responses	with	a	greater	degree	of	attention,	repeated	experiences,	or	where	background	knowledge	and	experience	fill	out	appreciation.	We	also	find	that	he	values	the	genesis	of	taste	across	our	lives,	from	childhood	to	adulthood,	as	it	develops	and	expands.	The	mature	taste	of	an	adult,	traced	through	empirical	experience	by	Reid,	rather	than	development	of	the	mind	
																																																								57	Hutcheson	also	alludes	to	this;	see	Inquiry,	28.	
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exclusively,	is	more	valuable,	but	he	also	observes	that	‘each	is	beautiful	in	its	season.’58			 The	broadness	in	Reid’s	account	also	reflects	an	interesting	pluralism	in	his	grasp	of	natural	beauty.	Like	Hutcheson,	he	provides	an	inventory	of	beauties,	but	two	points	of	contrast	are	immediately	apparent.	First,	Reid’s	inventory	is	less	systematic,	and	while	it	moves	through	the	natural	world,	from	inanimate	matter	to	plants	to	animals,	and	finally,	to	human	beauty,	he	does	not	really	treat	each	class	of	things	as	carefully	as	Hutcheson.	Second,	Reid	does	not	privilege	mathematical	theorems	as	a	class	of	beauty.	I	surmise	that	this	is	because	he	objects	to	the	reduction	of	beauty	to	one	source	or	common	quality,	as	we	see	found	in	‘uniformity	amidst	variety’.	He	argues:	‘Beauty	is	found	in	things	so	various,	and	so	very	different	in	nature,	that	it	is	difficult	to	say	wherein	it	consists,	or	what	there	can	be	common	to	all	objects	in	which	it	is	found….What	can	it	be	that	is	common	to	the	thought	of	a	mind,	and	the	form	of	a	piece	of	matter,	to	an	abstract	theorem,	and	a	strike	of	wit?	I	am	indeed	unable	to	conceive	any	quality	in	all	the	different	things	that	are	called	beautiful,	that	is	the	same	in	them	all’.59	Without	the	emphasis	on	mathematical	theorems	and	the	discussion	of	astronomical	phenomena,	order	and	harmony	are	mainly	limited	to	his	own	discussion	of	the	planets	and	the	universe,	and	otherwise	do	not	feature	strongly	in	his	theory.	The	upshot	is	a	more	pluralistic	
																																																								58	EIP,	614.	
59	EIP,	591;	see	also	EIP,	575;	and	Costelloe,	The	British	Aesthetic	Tradition,	30.	
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approach	to	natural	beauty	that	is	closer,	I	believe,	to	the	actual	range	of	natural	beauties	many	of	us	experience.60	I	shall	return	to	this	point	below.		 A	potential	stumbling	block	for	Reid’s	views	about	natural	beauty	arises	from	his	wider	philosophical	ideas	as	well	as	his	deism.	Unlike	Hutcheson,	Reid	draws	a	distinction	between	‘original’	and	‘derived’	beauty.	Original	beauty	is	found	in	qualities	of	mind,	while	‘objects	of	sense’	have	derived	beauty,	which	is	‘derived	from	some	relation	they	bear	to	mind,	as	the	signs	or	expressions	of	some	amiable	mental	quality,	or	as	the	effects	of	design,	art,	and	wise	contrivance.’61	Human	beings	have	original	beauty	(e.g.,	in	the	virtues),	and	works	of	art,	as	the	products	of	human	minds,	have	derived	beauty.62	Where	does	this	leave	natural	beauty	that	is	not	human	beauty?	This	is	where	Reid’s	deism	comes	to	the	fore.	Natural	beauties	will	exhibit	divine	mental	qualities	and	their	beauty	will	be	expressive	of	such	qualities.63	The	question	arises,	however,	as	to	whether	or	not	nature’s	derived	beauty	is	therefore	reduced	to	divine	beauty,	and	not	something	appreciated	in	its	own	right.	
																																																								60	This	wide-ranging	picture	of	beauty	need	not	collapse	into	relativism	because,	on	Reid’s	account,	we	nevertheless	perceive	excellences	as	objective	qualities;	see	Gallie’s	defence	of	Hutcheson	on	this	point	in,	Thomas	Reid,	148-149.	
61	EIP,	601.	
62	Reid	also	points	to	human	beings	as	the	greatest	kind	of	natural	beauty;	see	EIP,	608.		
63	Zuckert	shows	that	the	derived	beauty	of	plants	and	animals	is	also	expressive	of	mind	for	Reid,	in	the	sense	that	they	express	signs	of	flourishing	(‘Thomas	Reid’s	Expressivist	Aesthetics’).	Here,	we	see	mental	qualities	which	appear	to	be	reflected	across	human	and	non-human	life.	
	 29	
	 That	natural	beauty	is	reduced	to	divine	beauty	would	not	do	justice,	I	believe,	to	the	ways	in	which	Reid’s	aesthetic	theory	moves	on	from	Shaftesbury’s,	especially	in	light	of	Reid’s	familiarity	with	subsequent	theories	of	taste	and	beauty,	as	well	as	own	interest	in	natural	history	and	Newtonian	science.	A	more	charitable	interpretation,	supported	by	Reid’s	remarks	quoted	earlier,	would	be	that	nature	is	appreciated	as	beautiful	for	both	its	own	qualities	and	its	qualities	of	mind	as	derived	from	God.	That	is,	those	qualities,	even	if	indicators	of	and	originating	in	the	divine,	will	still	have	the	objective	qualities	that	make	something	beautiful,	such	as	a	particular	configuration	of	colours	and	forms.64			 	
Hutcheson,	Reid,	and	Contemporary	Debates	in	Aesthetics	of	Nature	and	
Environmental	Aesthetics		Perhaps	the	most	central	question	motivating	new	work	in	aesthetics	and	nature	and	environmental	aesthetics	is:	What	are	the	grounds	of	appropriate	aesthetic	judgments	of	nature?	One	way	that	appropriateness	is	construed	in	this	context	is	in	terms	of	appreciating	nature	as	nature	as	opposed	to,	say,	appreciating	nature	as	if	it	were	a	work	of	art.	With	works	of	art,	artistic	considerations	such	as	style	and																																																									64	Gallie	makes	a	similar,	though	rather	more	sophisticated,	argument	for	the	derived	beauty	of	objects	of	sense	(Thomas	Reid,	171-174).	Copenhaver	defends	Reid	against	claims	that	his	distinction	between	original	and	derived	beauty	commits	him	to	some	kind	of	subjectivism	(‘Thomas	Reid	and	Aesthetic	Perception’,	136).	These	arguments,	as	well	as	Zuckert’s	(see	previous	note),	provide	additional	reasons	why	derived	natural	beauty	may	be	considered	independently	of	human	or	divine	mind	or	intentions.	
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intention	help	to	ground	and	guide	our	judgments	about	why	we	find	works	of	art	beautiful,	ugly	and	so	on.	With	respect	to	nature	and	environment,	this	kind	of	guidance	does	not	make	much	sense,	so	we	need	to	consider	where	such	guidance	might	come	from.	If	one	agrees	with	the	view	that	aesthetic	judgments	of	nature	are	more	indeterminate	than	judgments	of	art	–	somehow	more	free,	less	constrained	by,	for	example,	by	the	conventions	and	ways	of	the	artworld	–	this	issue	becomes	especially	important.	Environmental	aesthetics	has	sought	to	move	beyond	imposing	human	frameworks	on	nature,	humanising	nature,	where	one	such	framework	would	be	appreciating	nature	always	through	the	lens	of	art.	The	aesthetic	perspective	is	commonly	identified	with	culture,	in	so	far	as	we	are,	here,	talking	about	aesthetic	valuing	made	by	human	culture.	That	is,	aesthetic	judgment	is	anthropogenic.	However,	it	is	possible	to	distinguish	between	aesthetic	perspectives	and	values	which	are	more	and	less	anthropocentric.		 In	recent	debates,	answers	to	the	question	of	appropriate	appreciation	of	nature	divide	into	two	competing	approaches:	‘scientific	cognitivism’	and	‘non-cognitivism’.	Scientific	cognitivism	holds	that	if	our	aesthetic	valuing	of	nature	is	to	reach	beyond	a	superficial	response	and	to	be	appropriate	to	what	it	is	we	perceive,	that	valuing	must	be	informed	by	scientific	knowledge.	The	most	well	established	position,	Allen	Carlson’s	‘natural	environmental	model’	rests	on	an	argument	by	analogy.65	In	artistic	judgments,	art	history	and	criticism	provide	the	appropriate	foundation.	For	natural	aesthetics,	Carlson	finds	the	most	legitimate	and	‘objective’																																																									65	Allen	Carlson,	Aesthetics	and	the	Environment:	The	Appreciation	of	Nature,	Art	and	Architecture	(London	and	New	York,	2000).	
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source	in	the	natural	sciences.	It	is	claimed	that	such	knowledge	will	ensure	aesthetic	judgments	that	accord	with	their	objects,	enabling	a	grasp	of	relevant	aesthetic	qualities.	For	example,	if	I	were	to	appreciate	a	humpback	whale	under	the	category	of	‘fish’	rather	than	‘mammal’,	the	whale	may	appear	as	a	clumsy	fish	rather	than	a	majestic	mammal	moving	gracefully	through	the	ocean.		 Non-cognitivists	agree	that	we	need	to	avoid	aesthetic	valuing	that	distorts	or	humanises	nature,	but	they	argue	that	scientific	cognitivism	too	narrowly	characterises	what	is	appropriate	and	thereby	discounts	the	range	of	legitimate	ways	we	experience	the	natural	world,	for	example,	through	immersive,	environmental,	appreciation,	or	responses	which	are	open	to	the	place	of	imagination	and	emotion	as	layers	that	enhance	perception	and	increase	forms	of	attention	to	the	world.66			 Now,	it	seems	to	me	that	a	baseline	for	appropriate	appreciation	will	be	a	non-instrumental	approach,	that	is,	one	that	appreciates	the	object	for	what	it	is,	the	qualities	it	actually	possesses.	Yuriko	Saito	expresses	this	idea	as	appreciating	nature	‘on	its	own	terms’,	which	means	adopting	a	normative	aesthetic	approach:	‘…an	attitude	which	would	involve	listening	to	nature’s	own	story….recognizing		and	respecting	nature	as	having	its	own	reality	apart	from	our	presence’.67	It	is	in	articulating	this	normative	feature	of	aesthetic	appreciation	of	nature	that	
																																																								66	For	a	representative	sample	of	cognitive	and	non-cognitive	approaches	in	environmental	aesthetics,	see,	Allen	Carlson	and	Arnold	Berleant,	ed.,	The	Aesthetics	of	Natural	Environments	(Peterborough,	2004).	
67	Yuriko	Saito,	‘Appreciating	Nature	on	Its	Own	Terms’,	Environmental	Ethics	20	(1998).		
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Hutcheson’s	theory	becomes	especially	significant,	in	so	far	as	disinterestedness	means	that	our	judgments	of	natural	beauty,	as	grounded	in	the	sense	of	beauty,	will	be	directed	at	natural	items,	processes	and	phenomena	themselves,	and	not	our	own	interests	or	desire	for	possession	or	appropriation.	On	his	account	(and	from	within	his	necessarily	more	anthropocentric	philosophical	and	historical	framework),	there	is	no	explicit	interest	in	grasping	nature’s	own	terms,	but	there	is	an	interest	in	theorizing	the	sense	of	beauty	as	independent	from	self-interest,	as	he	prepares	the	ground	for	his	case	for	the	moral	sense.	We	can	learn	from	his	approach	that	aesthetic	judgment	is	constrained	in	this	way,	and	as	such,	signifies	a	stance	that	will	resist	imposing	one’s	own	utilitarian	interests	–	human	interests	–	on	the	aesthetic	object.	Given	that	Reid	also	recognises	the	independence	of	beauty	from	utility,	his	ideas	are	consistent	with	such	an	approach.		 Our	own	human	ways	of	seeing	things	will	show	themselves	in	our	engagement	with	the	natural	world,	no	doubt,	and	we	may	never	be	able	to	grasp	what	nature’s	‘terms’,	in	fact,	are.	But	the	main	point	of	Saito’s	idea	is	that	we	ought	to	make	the	effort	if	we	are	truly	to	appreciate	nature	in	all	its	distinctiveness,	and	not	what	we	want	from	it	or	what	we	want	it	to	be.	This	does	not	mean	that	our	aesthetic	engagement	with	nature	must	be	totally	‘dehumanized’,	somehow	divorced	from	the	cultural	position	of	any	human	aesthetic	stance,	but	it	ought	not	be	overly	humanizing	either.	In	this	vein,	Hutcheson	recognizes	the	role	of	association	of	ideas,	and	with	respect	to	nature	this	takes	the	form	of	seeing	resemblances	between	nature	and	culture:	‘Thus	a	Tempest	at	Sea	is	often	an	
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Emblem	of	Wrath;	a	Plant	or	Tree	drooping	under	the	Rain,	of	a	Person	in	Sorrow’.68	However,	he	also	admonishes	the	way	some	associations	of	ideas	take	the	form	of	biases	which	prevent	proper	perception	of	beauty:	‘Thus	Swines,	Serpents	of	all	Kinds,	and	some	Insects	really	beautiful	enough,	are	beheld	with	Aversion	by	many	People,	who	have	got	some	accidental	Ideas	associated	to	them.’69	Reid	also	describes	expressiveness	in	nature	through	his	concept	of	natural	signs,	but	as	I	have	argued	earlier	in	the	paper,	his	account	is	not	reductive	and	recognises	the	excellences	that	underlie	beauty	of	nature	in	their	own	right.70		 The	independence	of	beauty	from	utility	and	knowledge	as	well	as	Hutcheson’s	categorising	of	the	natural	world	within	‘absolute’	beauty	makes	his	theory	of	beauty	a	good	fit	for	a	non-cognitive	approach.	That	knowledge	may	play	some	role	as	an	added	effect,	but	not	as	grounding	our	aesthetic	judgments,	is	also	present	in	both	Hutcheson’s	theory	and	non-cognitive	views.	Where	does	Reid’s	theory	fit	with	respect	to	contemporary	ideas	about	natural	beauty?		 Reid’s	distinction	between	instinctive	and	rational	beauty	is	especially	interesting	for	reflecting	on	this	question.	On	the	one	hand,	it	fits	with	cognitive	approaches	in	so	far	as	our	capacity	for	rational	beauty	means	that	when	we	gain	knowledge	and	experience	of,	say,	plants,	we	may	become	better	at	identifying	and	explaining	their	beauty.	But	unlike	Carlson,	Reid	does	not	appear	to	prioritise	the	experience	of	the	botanist	over	the	experience	of	the	florist,	which	also	has	more																																																									68	Inquiry,	44.		
69	Inquiry,	62.		
70	For	some	of	Reid’s	remarks	on	expressiveness	in	nature,	see	EIP,	590.	
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experience	(in	Reid’s	‘rational’	terms),	yet	not	from	science.	The	florist’s	experience	is	one	of	learning	how	to	formally	arrange	flowers	(based	largely	in	sensory	or	perceptual	experience)	and,	presumably,	developing	a	sense	for	what	colours	and	forms	work	best	to	create	appealing	arrangements.	For	Carlson,	the	botanist	would	always	make	the	most	appropriate	or	correct	judgments	because	they	have	knowledge	of	natural	history	and,	in	that	respect,	an	understanding	of	the	appropriate	appreciative	categories.		 In	this	way,	Reid’s	ideas	chime	nicely	with	theories	in	environmental	aesthetics	which	do	not	prioritise	perception	thickened	by	thought	elements	over	aesthetic	engagement	where	the	senses	are	more	prominent.	Ronald	Hepburn	explains	the	range	of	appropriate	appreciations	we	might	find	in	aesthetic	experience.	‘We	need	to	acknowledge	a	duality	in	much	aesthetic	appreciation	of	nature,	a	sensuous	component	and	a	thought-component.	First,	sensuous	immediacy:	in	the	purest	cases	one	is	taken	aback	by,	for	instance,	a	sky	colour-effect,	or	by	the	rolling	away	of	cloud	and	mist	from	a	landscape.	Most	often,	however,	an	element	of	thought	is	present,	as	we	implicitly	compare	and	contrast	here	with	elsewhere,	actual	and	possible,	present	with	past.’71	Each	experience	is	appropriate	and	aesthetically	valuable	for	Hepburn,	opening	up	space	for	a	wide	range	of	appropriate	responses	and	different	aesthetic	frameworks.	Given	Reid’s	botanist	and	florist,	as	well	as	the	instinctive	beauty	perceived	by	a	child,	we	find	a	more	open	approach	to	natural	beauty	than	the	cognitivist	offers.		
																																																								71	Ronald	W.	Hepburn,	Reach	of	the	Aesthetic	(Aldershot	and	Burlington,	2001),	2.	
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	 Instinctive	beauty	maps	nicely,	too,	onto	Saito’s	own	approach,	which	sits	between	the	cognitive	and	non-cognitive,	supporting	the	role	of	science	but	challenging	its	centrality.	Her	views	embrace	a	range	of	appreciative	frameworks,	which	nonetheless	begin	and	end	in	the	sensuous	surface	of	natural	phenomena.			 Certainly,	the	philosophical	ideas	of	Hutcheson	and	Reid	are	products	of	their	time.	Although	we	do	see	an	interest	in	nature	where	the	three	‘kingdoms’	of	nature	–	animal,	plant,	and	mineral	–	are	recognized	in	their	own	right	as	worthy	of	aesthetic	consideration,	their	overall	perspective	remains	anthropocentric.	Yet,	we	also	find	that	their	theories	of	beauty,	as	well	as	their	empirical	examples	from	natural	history,	are	sensitive	to	natural	qualities	possessed	independently	of	human	utility.	Ultimately,	their	views	present	a	non-instrumental	valuing	of	natural	beauty	that	is	meaningful	in	its	own	time	and	significant	for	ours.				
